linux-stable-rt/include/net/af_unix.h

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#ifndef __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
#define __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
extern void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
extern void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
extern void unix_gc(void);
#define UNIX_HASH_SIZE 256
extern unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
struct unix_address {
atomic_t refcnt;
int len;
unsigned hash;
struct sockaddr_un name[0];
};
struct unix_skb_parms {
struct ucred creds; /* Skb credentials */
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Security ID */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#endif
};
#define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
#define UNIXCREDS(skb) (&UNIXCB((skb)).creds)
#define UNIXSID(skb) (&UNIXCB((skb)).secid)
#define unix_state_lock(s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
#define unix_state_unlock(s) spin_unlock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
#define unix_state_lock_nested(s) \
spin_lock_nested(&unix_sk(s)->lock, \
SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING)
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/* The AF_UNIX socket */
struct unix_sock {
/* WARNING: sk has to be the first member */
struct sock sk;
struct unix_address *addr;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
struct mutex readlock;
struct sock *peer;
struct sock *other;
struct list_head link;
atomic_long_t inflight;
spinlock_t lock;
unsigned int gc_candidate : 1;
wait_queue_head_t peer_wait;
};
#define unix_sk(__sk) ((struct unix_sock *)__sk)
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
extern int unix_sysctl_register(struct net *net);
extern void unix_sysctl_unregister(struct net *net);
#else
static inline int unix_sysctl_register(struct net *net) { return 0; }
static inline void unix_sysctl_unregister(struct net *net) {}
#endif
#endif
#endif