linux-stable-rt/arch/um/kernel/exec.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com)
* Licensed under the GPL
*/
#include "linux/stddef.h"
#include "linux/fs.h"
#include "linux/smp_lock.h"
#include "linux/ptrace.h"
#include "linux/sched.h"
#include "asm/current.h"
#include "asm/processor.h"
#include "asm/uaccess.h"
#include "mem_user.h"
#include "skas.h"
#include "os.h"
void flush_thread(void)
{
void *data = NULL;
unsigned long end = proc_mm ? task_size : CONFIG_STUB_START;
int ret;
arch_flush_thread(&current->thread.arch);
ret = unmap(&current->mm->context.skas.id, 0, end, 1, &data);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR "flush_thread - clearing address space failed, "
"err = %d\n", ret);
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
__switch_mm(&current->mm->context.skas.id);
}
void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long eip, unsigned long esp)
{
set_fs(USER_DS);
PT_REGS_IP(regs) = eip;
PT_REGS_SP(regs) = esp;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TTY_LOG
extern void log_exec(char **argv, void *tty);
#endif
static long execve1(char *file, char __user * __user *argv,
char __user *__user *env)
{
long error;
#ifdef CONFIG_TTY_LOG
[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 18:36:04 +08:00
struct tty_struct *tty;
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 18:36:04 +08:00
tty = get_current_tty();
if (tty)
log_exec(argv, tty);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
#endif
error = do_execve(file, argv, env, &current->thread.regs);
if (error == 0) {
task_lock(current);
current->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE;
#ifdef SUBARCH_EXECVE1
SUBARCH_EXECVE1(&current->thread.regs.regs);
#endif
task_unlock(current);
}
return error;
}
long um_execve(char *file, char __user *__user *argv, char __user *__user *env)
{
long err;
err = execve1(file, argv, env);
if (!err)
UML_LONGJMP(current->thread.exec_buf, 1);
return err;
}
long sys_execve(char __user *file, char __user *__user *argv,
char __user *__user *env)
{
long error;
char *filename;
lock_kernel();
filename = getname(file);
error = PTR_ERR(filename);
if (IS_ERR(filename)) goto out;
error = execve1(filename, argv, env);
putname(filename);
out:
unlock_kernel();
return error;
}