original_kernel/arch/arm64/kvm/pauth.c

207 lines
4.7 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2024 - Google LLC
* Author: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
*
* Primitive PAuth emulation for ERETAA/ERETAB.
*
* This code assumes that is is run from EL2, and that it is part of
* the emulation of ERETAx for a guest hypervisor. That's a lot of
* baked-in assumptions and shortcuts.
*
* Do no reuse for anything else!
*/
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/gpr-num.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
/* PACGA Xd, Xn, Xm */
#define PACGA(d,n,m) \
asm volatile(__DEFINE_ASM_GPR_NUMS \
".inst 0x9AC03000 |" \
"(.L__gpr_num_%[Rd] << 0) |" \
"(.L__gpr_num_%[Rn] << 5) |" \
"(.L__gpr_num_%[Rm] << 16)\n" \
: [Rd] "=r" ((d)) \
: [Rn] "r" ((n)), [Rm] "r" ((m)))
static u64 compute_pac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 ptr,
struct ptrauth_key ikey)
{
struct ptrauth_key gkey;
u64 mod, pac = 0;
preempt_disable();
if (!vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, SYSREGS_ON_CPU))
mod = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, SP_EL2);
else
mod = read_sysreg(sp_el1);
gkey.lo = read_sysreg_s(SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1);
gkey.hi = read_sysreg_s(SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1);
__ptrauth_key_install_nosync(APGA, ikey);
isb();
PACGA(pac, ptr, mod);
isb();
__ptrauth_key_install_nosync(APGA, gkey);
preempt_enable();
/* PAC in the top 32bits */
return pac;
}
static bool effective_tbi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool bit55)
{
u64 tcr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR_EL2);
bool tbi, tbid;
/*
* Since we are authenticating an instruction address, we have
* to take TBID into account. If E2H==0, ignore VA[55], as
* TCR_EL2 only has a single TBI/TBID. If VA[55] was set in
* this case, this is likely a guest bug...
*/
if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu)) {
tbi = tcr & BIT(20);
tbid = tcr & BIT(29);
} else if (bit55) {
tbi = tcr & TCR_TBI1;
tbid = tcr & TCR_TBID1;
} else {
tbi = tcr & TCR_TBI0;
tbid = tcr & TCR_TBID0;
}
return tbi && !tbid;
}
static int compute_bottom_pac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool bit55)
{
static const int maxtxsz = 39; // Revisit these two values once
static const int mintxsz = 16; // (if) we support TTST/LVA/LVA2
u64 tcr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR_EL2);
int txsz;
if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu) || !bit55)
txsz = FIELD_GET(TCR_T0SZ_MASK, tcr);
else
txsz = FIELD_GET(TCR_T1SZ_MASK, tcr);
return 64 - clamp(txsz, mintxsz, maxtxsz);
}
static u64 compute_pac_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool bit55)
{
int bottom_pac;
u64 mask;
bottom_pac = compute_bottom_pac(vcpu, bit55);
mask = GENMASK(54, bottom_pac);
if (!effective_tbi(vcpu, bit55))
mask |= GENMASK(63, 56);
return mask;
}
static u64 to_canonical_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 ptr, u64 mask)
{
bool bit55 = !!(ptr & BIT(55));
if (bit55)
return ptr | mask;
return ptr & ~mask;
}
static u64 corrupt_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 ptr)
{
bool bit55 = !!(ptr & BIT(55));
u64 mask, error_code;
int shift;
if (effective_tbi(vcpu, bit55)) {
mask = GENMASK(54, 53);
shift = 53;
} else {
mask = GENMASK(62, 61);
shift = 61;
}
if (esr_iss_is_eretab(kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu)))
error_code = 2 << shift;
else
error_code = 1 << shift;
ptr &= ~mask;
ptr |= error_code;
return ptr;
}
/*
* Authenticate an ERETAA/ERETAB instruction, returning true if the
* authentication succeeded and false otherwise. In all cases, *elr
* contains the VA to ERET to. Potential exception injection is left
* to the caller.
*/
bool kvm_auth_eretax(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *elr)
{
u64 sctlr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL2);
u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
u64 ptr, cptr, pac, mask;
struct ptrauth_key ikey;
*elr = ptr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, ELR_EL2);
/* We assume we're already in the context of an ERETAx */
if (esr_iss_is_eretab(esr)) {
if (!(sctlr & SCTLR_EL1_EnIB))
return true;
ikey.lo = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, APIBKEYLO_EL1);
ikey.hi = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, APIBKEYHI_EL1);
} else {
if (!(sctlr & SCTLR_EL1_EnIA))
return true;
ikey.lo = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, APIAKEYLO_EL1);
ikey.hi = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, APIAKEYHI_EL1);
}
mask = compute_pac_mask(vcpu, !!(ptr & BIT(55)));
cptr = to_canonical_addr(vcpu, ptr, mask);
pac = compute_pac(vcpu, cptr, ikey);
/*
* Slightly deviate from the pseudocode: if we have a PAC
* match with the signed pointer, then it must be good.
* Anything after this point is pure error handling.
*/
if ((pac & mask) == (ptr & mask)) {
*elr = cptr;
return true;
}
/*
* Authentication failed, corrupt the canonical address if
* PAuth2 isn't implemented, or some XORing if it is.
*/
if (!kvm_has_pauth(vcpu->kvm, PAuth2))
cptr = corrupt_addr(vcpu, cptr);
else
cptr = ptr ^ (pac & mask);
*elr = cptr;
return false;
}