b348d7dddb
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted. Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data. Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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| .. | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README | ||
| stub.h | ||
| stub_dev.c | ||
| stub_main.c | ||
| stub_rx.c | ||
| stub_tx.c | ||
| usbip_common.c | ||
| usbip_common.h | ||
| usbip_event.c | ||
| vhci.h | ||
| vhci_hcd.c | ||
| vhci_rx.c | ||
| vhci_sysfs.c | ||
| vhci_tx.c | ||
README
TODO: - more discussion about the protocol - testing - review of the userspace interface - document the protocol Please send patches for this code to Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>