90f62cf30a
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| netfilter | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README | ||
| TODO | ||
| af_decnet.c | ||
| dn_dev.c | ||
| dn_fib.c | ||
| dn_neigh.c | ||
| dn_nsp_in.c | ||
| dn_nsp_out.c | ||
| dn_route.c | ||
| dn_rules.c | ||
| dn_table.c | ||
| dn_timer.c | ||
| sysctl_net_decnet.c | ||
README
Linux DECnet Project
======================
The documentation for this kernel subsystem is available in the
Documentation/networking subdirectory of this distribution and also
on line at http://www.chygwyn.com/DECnet/
Steve Whitehouse <SteveW@ACM.org>